Human-centric Computing and Information Sciences volume 12, Article number: 08 (2022)
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https://doi.org/10.22967/HCIS.2022.12.008
Currently, the world is experiencing a global pandemic due to the spread of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), a disease stemming from a novel coronavirus. The main measure used to contain the rapid spread and to control this virus’s contamination rate is social distancing. This method has dramatically affected citizens’ daily lives. To this end, replacing face-to-face meetings with virtual meetings using cloud videoconferencing application solutions has emerged. This approach has indeed solved this problem for millions of schools, companies, governments, and individuals worldwide. However, security and privacy concerns arise. The number of videoconferencing users has increased during the pandemic, yet some applications offer only unencrypted communication for unpaid users. Moreover, uninvited attendees can join virtual meetings, collect sensitive information about users and shared files, and participate in them using deepfake tools. To resolve this dilemma, we propose in this paper a lightweight, scalable blockchain-based authentication mechanism to secure cloud videoconferencing. Private blockchain, as a decentralized network, can handle user authentication and provide complete data privacy to shared information in a virtual meeting. Moreover, to reduce the latency and mining processing overhead and for scalability of the system, we use a time-based consensus algorithm. Our simulation shows very low latency results, perfect for a video system.
Blockchain Videoconferencing, Security, Privacy, Authentication
Videoconferencing is not a new term. This concept dates to the late 19th century under the name of videotelephony [1]. The year 1930 marked the first publicly available videotelephone, which was in a booth installed in a post office. With the development of Internet technologies and the widespread use of computers, AT&T successfully created the first version of videoconferencing in 1970, by which anyone could subscribe to and use the service in the comfort of their own home. Web-based videoconferencing allows users in different locations to engage in real-time face-to-face interactions over the Internet. This technology revolutionized numerous industries, including finance, medical, and education, among others. With regard to medications, for example, patients with mild symptoms are not required to visit hospitals and wait in line to talk to a doctor or physician; instead, they can use telemedicine, which is a form of videoconferencing hosted by doctors and their patients. Telemedicine accordingly helps with the practice of medicine using technology at a distance and reduces the stress of visitors on hospitals, thus reducing contamination and virus propagation.
Videoconferencing has been used and developed over the years for various reasons; notably, with the current global pandemic of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), multiple industries are forced to work remotely instead of in regular offices. Principally with the launch of 5G network technology, it enhances videoconferencing resolution and the quality-of-service perceptions, which significantly influenced users. The usage of videoconferencing applications has noticeably increased during the global pandemic. For example, “Zoom,” a videoconferencing application, was founded in 2011 but only received attention from the public in 2020 due to the COVID-19 epidemic, reaching 300 million daily users, with 3 trillion annual meeting minutes [2]. This well-known videoconferencing software was downloaded 485 million times in 2020 alone. Users worldwide, including companies, schools, hospitals, and individuals, rely on web-based videoconferencing such as Zoom, Google Meet, Skype, and many more, for various reasons. Videoconferencing appears to connect people regardless of their distance and/or circumstances. Users only need a device connected to the Internet, such as a smartphone or computer, to connect, have face-to-face meetings, socialize with friends and family, follow real-time courses, and receive quick advice from their doctors.
Videoconferencing technology is helping millions worldwide in their daily lives, generally during unique and challenging situations such as COVID-19 and over long distances. However, concerns about its security and privacy arise. During a virtual meeting over the Internet, users tend to share sensitive information, such as their faces, full names, ID numbers, company data, and medical data, among other types. Moreover, videoconferencing software allows file and screen sharing as well; such files may include confidential data but are openly shared over the Internet. Some videoconferencing applications do not provide robust data security for unpaid users, exposing the data transmitted by normal users openly. This is a critical issue that users and service providers should not disregard. Recently, it was reported that nearly 352 Zoom application users accounts were comprised. These accounts include those of healthcare providers and school institutions in the United States. Moreover, more than 500,000 instances of account information were leaked and sold over the dark web. Hence, videoconferencing security and privacy are significant concerns that urge quick responses from service providers as the usage of this technology has grown over time.
On the other hand, blockchain technology, as a secure, shared ledger, and its sub-technologies such as smart contracts can bring about desirable security and privacy to videoconferencing systems. Blockchain is a technology that has been used recently to secure data and ensure the authentication of multiple services in an innovative city environment. To this end, and to solve the security concerns related to videoconferencing technologies, we propose in this paper the usage of blockchain technology fully to support the confidentiality, integrity, authentication, and privacy of users and entities such as companies. We discuss various types of potential attacks on videoconferencing software and the types of data that can be leaked. Moreover, through our proposed architecture and the use of a lightweight private blockchain, we satisfy the latency and real-time communication requirements while not affecting the quality-of-service and quality-of-experience metrics. Our primary research contributions are presented below
We propose a simple architecture based on blockchain to secure communication between users over videoconferencing software. Blockchain technology is used to secure users’ identities and shared data and to control authentication and the users who have access to the data.
An organized study of potential attacks and data leakage events is provided to demonstrate the threats and the types of data that can be exposed.
We discuss the potential of the proposed architecture by simulating it, calculating the latency, and explaining how it can be prone to cyberattacks.
Open research issues related to the use of blockchain for videoconferencing technology are discussed, as are related performance issues.
In this section, first we discuss some of the main seminal contributions, offer an overview of blockchain and videoconferencing systems, and discuss the primary key consideration of the proposed framework.
Spoofing: Spoofing in videoconferencing can be divided into three categories source device spoofing, content spoofing, and action spoofing [14]. Source device spoofing is when an attacker steals device-related data such as the identification and IP address and pretends to be the actual device to access the server. Content spoofing refers to the modification of video or audio contents during a videoconferencing call. Action spoofing is when an attacker successfully enters a system and alters an action by replacing it with another one. Thus, when a user chose this action, he will be prone to attacks as well.
Tampering: The tampering of data based on cloud services occurs when an attacker manages to access data storage devices and manipulate video/audio files and shared files data [15]. An attacker can delete, modify, and manipulate the stored data in a method known as, log data tampering.
Repudiation: When a user is not honest, he can deny receiving any data or, in more severe cases, manipulate the data obtained. This is known as content data repudiation [16].
Activity hiding: An attacker can manage to hide all his activities and refuse to participate in a future investigation with the system [14]
Information disclosure: When an unauthorized user joins a system, this user can disclose other participants’ data, such as their names, locations, faces, and voice patterns, among other types. Moreover, the attacker can disclose other users’ device information, such as their IPs, locations, and shared files [17].
Call data disclosure: An unauthorized user can make a soft copy of a video call and share it with other malicious attackers for various reasons [18]. In secret video meetings such as company videoconferencing, or juridical videoconferencing, any disclosure or copy of the information shared has high costs.
Denial of service: Denial of service (DoS) is performed by an attacker to make a service non-accessible by authorized users. This can be done by sending falsified packs and creating traffic in the system. On the other hand, a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack refers to multiple devices joining in, making the entire system inaccessible. In some cases, even the participant’s devices can be a source of DDoS attacks [19].
Elevation of privilege: The elevation of privilege attack is when an attacker manages to have the admin or service provider’s control. It is usually a typical attack that requires much experience and various technologies. Thus, it is critical to the system. In most cases, the service provider does not know it has been compromised by an attacker in such cases [20].
Hardware integrity attack: After successfully joining a system, an attacker may access honest users’ devices and manipulate them [22]. The attacker can bypass the security measures set by video-conferencing services such as firewalls and passwords.
Reverse engineering: An attacker can access the service provider’s application code and reverse-engineer it based on a desire to perform more serious attacks [23].
Footprinting: This attack refers to when an intruder manages to learn about video call session aspects, such as the time, number of participants, and subject [24]. This may not be directly a harmful attack, but it can lead to more critical issues.
Fuzzing: Fuzzing is a testing method for software to discover its weaknesses and security issues [25]. Cyber-attackers widely use this method to learn more about the software and system.
Brute Force: A brute force attack is a type of trial-and-error attack during which an attacker launches a variety of attacks simultaneously to discover the best way to access the system [26].
System Overview
The proposed blockchain-based videoconferencing security framework consists of three main layers: (1) the device layer, (2) the edge layer, and (3) the cloud layer.
The device layer involves several users, joining videoconferencing devices such as phones, computers, cameras, projectors, and Internet connections such as 5G networks. The user layer is based on heterogeny; honest and misbehaving users are all parts of this layer. The edge layer is where our blockchain resides. In this layer, blockchain is used to verify, validate, and authenticate users. Honest users will be added to the Blockchain ledger as a transaction with a signed certificate.
While dishonest devices will be excluded from the ledger, only users with signed validated certificates can participate in the videoconferencing system. Instruments that show signs of manipulation will be signaled to the blockchain and rejected from the communication channel. The last layer of the proposed framework is the cloud layer. The cloud layer is where the data center resides, and it serves as a means of communication between users. Real-time videos are uploaded and downloaded from the data center at the cloud layer. The cloud data center manages all users and hosts videoconferencing applications such as Zoom software. The details mentioned above are depicted in Fig. 2.
Step 1: The first user who intends to start a videoconferencing call must send a request with its own device identification, the pseudo name used, the timestamp, and a nonce, to the service provider. The timestamp and nonce are used to verify the consistency of the messages sent by the same user.
Step 2: The videoconferencing platform provider will verify the identification of the first sender and judge the validity of this user.
Step 3: If the first user is judged to be honest by the service provider, the blockchain consensus protocol will be initialized. The service provider will send a public key to the first user. This key is calculated in the MD5 digest and with a 128-bit hash value.
Step 4: The first user utilizes the received public key to encrypt a message and send it to users who intend to join the videoconference call, including a timestamp and a nonce. Because the nonce and timestamp are different every time, this step eliminates the possibility of a reply attack. Moreover, there is a giving time delay rate to be accepted, and if the time delay is exceeded, the receiver would know that there is a man-in-the-middle attack occurring in the system.
Step 5: Every user who receives the message from the first user will forward the message to the blockchain pre-selected verification nodes, with the received encrypted message, timestamp, and nonce, adding a new timestamp that indicates the time of message reception.
Step 6: The blockchain pre-selected verification nodes, acquiring pre-knowledge of the service provider public key, will decrypt and verify the message and the timestamps received. The system has a certain amount of an acceptable time delay. The decryption phase and details are out of the scope of this study.
Step 7: If the timestamp exceeds the system accepted time delay or if the message is incorrect, the verification node will declare the user as malicious. Otherwise, the user will be stated as honest.
Step 8: All participating verification nodes continue to send replies to the service provider until the received number of messages exceeds 51% of the participating nodes. Once the required number of messages is received, the system reaches a consensus.
Step 9: The service provider will verify the received replies. If the user is judged as honest, a new block is created. Otherwise, the identification of the malicious user will be stored at the service provider’s server at the cloud layer and this user will be denied access to the videoconferencing call.
Step 10: If the same user ID is declared a malicious device more than five times, the device will be denied access to the service or used as a penalty. At the same time, honest devices once identified will be capable of joining the service and participating in the videoconferencing call and passing subsequent verification.
Variable | Definition | Variable | Definition |
---|---|---|---|
$R, R_{id}$ | The root node, the first node to request a video conference call and its respective identification | $U_{id}$ | Identification |
$SP_k$ | Service Provider | $VN$ | Verification nodes |
$Msg$ | Message | $Δt$ | Permissioned delay |
t | Timestamp | $HL$ | Honest user list |
$ML$ | Malicious nodes list | $SP_{pid}$ | Pseudo key of the service provider |
$Bmsg$ | Broadcasted message | $n$ | Random nonce |
Study | Technology | Efficiency | Security | Privacy |
---|---|---|---|---|
Kiah et al. [3] | RSA and AES | No | Yes | Yes |
Khalaf et al. [4] | Blockchain | Yes | No | No |
Jan et al. [5] | Blockchain | Yes | No | Yes |
Gipp et al. [6] | Blockchain, SHA256 | No | Yes | Yes |
Hasan and Salah [7] | Blockchain | No | Yes | Yes |
This work | Blockchain | Yes | Yes | Yes |
The videoconferencing system is an emerging technology, especially with the recent COVID-19 pandemic and the increased usage of such platforms. With the development of 5G technologies, videoconferencing systems are essential in our daily lives, whether in relation to work, study, or for simple and casual meetings. However, security issues and dilemmas arise. Multiple cases of deepfake video and Zoom bombing have been recorded in increased numbers during the pandemic. To this end, and in this paper, we propose the deployment of blockchain technology. A private blockchain as a secure ledger can ensure the security and privacy desired for such systems. Moreover, a private blockchain channel can verify, validate, and authenticate all participating users on the same videoconferencing call. Users who have been reported as malicious devices more than five times will be permanently rejected from the service. Blockchain deployment for videoconferencing security is a necessary step that requires urgent integration to create a safe and private environment for videoconferencing.
This research was supported by Energy Cloud R&D Program (No. 2019M3F2A1073386) through the National Research Foundation of Korea, both funded by the Ministry of Science and ICT.
Conceptualization, AEA, MYC. Methodology, AEA. Software, AEA. Validation, AEA, MYC. Formal analysis, AEA. Investigation, AEA. Resources, AEA, MYC. Writing—original draft preparation, AEA, MYC. Writing—review and editing, AEA, MYC, JHP. Visualization, AEA. Supervision, JHP. Project administration, JHP, CHL. Funding acquisition, CHL. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.
The authors declare that they have no competing interests.
Abir El Azzaoui received a B.S. degree in computer science from the University of PicardieJules-Verne, Amiens, France. And a master’s degree from the Seoul University of Science and Technology, Seoul, South Korea. She is currently pursuing a PhD degree in computer science and engineering with the Ubiquitous Computing Security (UCS) Laboratory, Seoul National University of Science and Technology, Seoul, South Korea, under the supervision of Prof. Jong Hyuk Park. Her current research interests include Quantum communication, Blockchain, Internet-of-Things (IoT) security, and cloud security. She is also a reviewer of the IEEE Access, and IEE TII journal.
Minyeong Choi received a B.S. degree in electrical engineering from JeonBuk national university, Jeonju, South Korea. He is currently pursuing his master’s degree in computer science and engineering with Cyber Information Security (CIS) Laboratory at Seoul National University of Science and Technology. His research interests include digital forensics, encryption, information security, cyber threat intelligence, and lightweight cryptography.
Seungwon Jung received a B.S. degree in computer science from Seoul National University of Science and Technology, Seoul, South Korea. He is currently pursuing his master’s degree at the same university with Cyber Information Security (CIS) Laboratory. His research interests include digital forensics, cryptography, information security, and cyber threat intelligence.
Dr. Changhoon Lee received his Ph.D. degree in Graduate School of Information Management and Security (GSIMS) from Korea University, Korea. In 2008, he was a research professor at the Center for Information Security Technologies in Korea University. In 2009-2011, he was a professor in the School of Computer Engineering in Hanshin University. He is now a professor at the Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Seoul National University of Science and Technology(SeoulTech), Korea. He has been serving not only as chairs, program committee, or organizing committee chair for many international conferences and workshops but also as a (guest) editor for international journals by some publishers. His research interests include Cyber Threats Intelligence(CTI), Information Security, Cryptography, Digital Forensics, IoT Security, Computer Theory etc. He is currently a member of the IEEE, IEEE Computer Society, IEEE Communications, IACR, KIISC, KDFS, KIPS, KITCS, KMMS, KONI, and KIIT societies.
Dr. Jong Hyuk (James J.) Park received Ph.D. degrees in the Graduate School of Information Security from Korea University, Korea. He is a professor at the Department of Computer Science and Engineering and Department of Interdisciplinary Bio IT Materials, Seoul National University of Science and Technology (SeoulTech), Korea. He is editor-in-chief of Human-centric Computing and Information Sciences (HCIS) by KIPS, The Journal of Information Processing Systems (JIPS) by KIPS, and Journal of Convergence (JoC) by KIPS CSWRG. His research interests include IoT, Human-centric Ubiquitous Computing, Information Security, Digital Forensics, Vehicular Cloud Computing, Multimedia Computing, and so on. In addition, he has been serving as a Guest Editor for international journals by some publishers: Springer, Elsevier, John Wiley, Oxford University Press, Emerald, Inderscience, and MDPI.
Abir El Azzaoui, Min Yeong Choi, Chang Hoon Lee, and Jong Hyuk Park*, Scalable Lightweight Blockchain-Based Authentication Mechanism for Secure VoIP Communication, Article number: 12:08 (2022) Cite this article 2 Accesses
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